Seandainya Saya Fans United (2)

Oleh Mahfud Ikhwan

Seandainya saja fans United, ini adalah hari-hari di mana hati tengah berbunga-bunga.

Begitu musim berakhir, United telah mendapat tanda tangan Kagawa. Bocah Jepang yang dibesarkan Ragnick di Signal Iduna Park selama dua musim itu, datang ke Manchester tak hanya dengan sensasi kalau ia berpacar seorang AVN Idol, tapi juga dengan serangkai penampilan pramusim yang sangat menjanjikan. Dan, di tengah pekan ini, hati yang berbunga-bunga itu akan pecah berantakan oleh euforia yang tak tertahankan. Van Persie, top skorer musim lalu, penyelamat Arsenal di paroh terakhir musim dengan gol-gol sehingga menghindarkan Gudang Peluru bernasib seperti Inter di Italia, telah bermusim-musim menebar ketakutan di barisan belakang United yang menua. Dan kini, monster kidal yang semakin terasah kaki kanannya itu, ada di kubu mereka.

Bingkisan lebaran yang luar biasa, bukan?

Kagawa menegaskan bahwa visi yang selama ini dipakai Fergie membesarkan United masih dipakai: mendatangkan pemain muda. Datang dengan status yang jauh lebih mentereng jika dibanding kebanyakan pemain-pemain belia yang didatangkan Fergie ke Old Trafford belakangan ini (dengan dua gelar Bundesliga bersama Dortmund), Kagawa adalah wujud bahwa sebuah tradisi bagus dan terbukti sukses dari sebuah klub hebat masih terus dipertahankan. Sembari mengenang musim 1999 dengan bangga, seorang pencinta United mungkin kini sudah mereka-reka di kepalanya tentang sebuah tim, dengan de Gea, Smalling, John, Cleverly, Kagawa, Welbeck, dan Chicarito ada di dalamnya, akan mengangkat treble saat usia mereka belum lagi 25.

Tapi datangnya van Persie—melebihi semua itu—bukanlah sebuah bayangan, tak semata visi. Tanda tangannya di depan dewan direksi United adalah sebuah gol di menit pertama; sebuah gebrakan yang menandakan bahwa United akan kembali mendapatkan apa yang selama ini menjadi haknya—gelar demi gelar. Siapa pun yang intens mengikuti United dari masa ke masa, akan tahu apa arti dari bergantinya van Persie dari baju merah berlengan putih ke baju merah kotak-kotak. Ia adalah sekepal batu yang bisa menjatuhkan dua burung dalam sekali lempar.

Menilik betapa musim lalu van Persie hampir sendirian membawa Arsenal tetap bertahan di habitatnya di empat besar, memindahkannya dari Emirates ke Old Trafford sama halnya mencuri separoh peluru dari meriam putus asa yang telah sewindu lebih tanpa piala itu. Jika saya fans United, saya akan berani berpikir bahwa mengambil van Persie dari para Gooner sama halnya memreteli dua tangan Michael Pelps sebelum menceburkannya ke kolam renang; ia mungkin tetap akan bisa mengapung di air (karena ia Michael Pelps), tapi ia musti butuh waktu untuk bisa berenang tanpa lengan. Mereka boleh punya Podolski, Girroud, dan terakhir Carzola, tapi normalnya, mereka tentu butuh waktu.

Yang mungkin lebih menggembirakan, kedatangan van Persie ke kompleks latihan Carrington pastinya juga jadi kemenangan pramusim yang mengesankan atas musuh lama tapi baru—si kaos abu-abu. Ya, ini memang bukan pertandingan yang seharusnya—bagaimana mungkin United absen dari Community Shield setelah lima musim berturut-turut? Ini juga tanpa piala. Tapi, percayalah, gengsi dan arti besarnya luar biasa. Menjadikan van Persie pasangan Rooney di Theatre of Dream dan bukannya jadi cadangan Balotelli di Carravan of Oil bisa berarti: 1) mengalahkan mereka dalam berebut pemain yang diinginkan—hal yang dalam tiga musim terakhir sulit sekali dilakukan oleh klub manapun saat berhadapan dengan City; 2) menunjukkan pada dunia bahwa, tak seperti yang dalam beberapa musim terakhir ini banyak dibicarakan, Fergie bisa kembali berbelanja dengan duit besar (United tetap klub kaya, tau!); 3) seorang pemain hebat yang ingin memperoleh gelar telah menunjukkan kalau ia lebih memilih tradisi dibanding sensasi; 4) MU telah lebih dari siap untuk meraih gelar, sebagaimana biasa.

Sementara melihat tetangga sebelah kebingungan mau menjual pemain-pemain tak bergunanya namun menghabiskan alokasi gaji, menunggu Arsenal bertransisi, mengamati Chelsea yang mantap dalam belanja untuk keperluan di lapangan tapi sangat ragu di sektor bangku cadangan, Spurs yang tengah coba-coba, dan Liverpool yang sepertinya memilih proyek jangka panjang, jika saya fans United, saya akan sangat yakin menyongsong liga musim ini.

***     

Tapi saya bukan fans United. Dan, tentu saja, saya punya pandangan lain. Juga perasaan lain.

Begitu mendengar mereka berhasil mendaratkan van Persie,  para pembenci United pastilah blingsatan seketika. Betapa mengerikannya membayangkan van Persie satu baju dengan Wayne Rooney—dua nama yang selalu mengisi daftar pencetak gol-gol hebat di EPL dalam beberapa musim terakhir ini. Para pendukung tim lain pastinya akan berharap-harap cemas dengan nasib penjaga gawang mereka. Jika pada musim 2011 United bahkan bisa juara dengan mengandalkan Chicarito, seorang striker yang ‘kebetulan’ tajam, bagaimana jika mereka memiliki dua orang striker kejam?

Tapi, para pembenci United, coba duduk sebentar, lalu tenangkan pikiran. Dan, dalam beberapa saat, kalian akan menemukan bahwa kalian tak perlu secemas itu. Van Persie datang ke United dengan transfer 24 juta Pound, usia 29, dan riwayat cedera yang panjang dalam CV-nya. Jadi, percayalah, itu bukan hanya belanja yang tak terlalu brilian dari Sir Alex, tapi bahkan berisiko.

Saya agak sulit mengerti bagaimana staf medis MU begitu saja mengabaikan rentannya otot kaki van Persie. Mungkin 32 golnya musim lalu menghapus jejak kurang baik itu, termasuk menghapus jejaknya yang samar di tim Arsenal pada tujuh musim sebelumnya yang tanpa gelar dan tanpa peran yang semenonjol Fabregas atau bahkan si bengal Nasri. Tapi, bisa jadi, dalam 24 juta Pound itu, MU memang tak hanya membeli kaki kiri van Persie, tapi juga menghidup-hidupi bayangan mereka sendiri tentang betapa akan lemahnya salah satu musuh mereka, Arsenal—setelah mereka gagal berebut Eden Hazard dengan Chelsea musim ini dan dipermalukan City saat mereka membajak Tevez tiga musim lalu.

Tapi yang lebih membingungkan adalah kenapa mereka membeli striker, sementara yang mereka butuhkan adalah pemain tengah. Dengan melambatnya Berba, munculnya Chicarito dan prospektifnya Welbeck, dan tetap kokohnya Rooney, tak pernah membuat MU jadi tim mandul—apalagi jika Young terus saja mengasah keterampilannya dalam hal menjatuhkan diri. Dalam hemat saya (seperti yang pernah saya utarakan dalam tulisan tentang United sebelumnya), United membutuhkan seorang playmaker lebih dari apapun. Jadi, cukup mengherankan jika mereka membawa buku cek itu ke London dan bukannya ke Milan, sebab seharusnya mereka tidak membutuhkan van Persie melainkan rekan setimnya di timnas Belanda, Sneijder. (Jika pun mereka ke London, bidikan seharusnya diarahkan ke White Hart Lane, di mana seorang pemain tengah elegan yang sudah tak kerasan, namanya Luka Modric, sedang menunggu pinangan.)

Dengan mata telanjang dapat dilihat, apa yang membuat mereka diempaskan City pada musim lalu adalah level pemain-pemain tengah mereka yang rendah. Fletcher pemain bagus, tapi tim seperti MU tentu saja membutuhkan lebih dari sekadar pemain bagus. Anderson akan tampak sebagai pemain hebat jika ia bermain di tim yang nyaman dengan peringkat 12 atau 10 di tabel liga.

Tapi, meski bukan fans United, dengan bergabungnya Kagawa dan van Persie, saya berharap MU tetap akan mampu bersaing. Paling tidak dengan Arsenal.

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The Death of Indonesian Supporters (Part II): Socio-Political Explanation

Oleh Darmanto Simaepa

'The new violence' in Indonesian football is more closely related with the two-parallel important aspect of the contemporary of Indonesian socio-politicis, which are the dynamics of local politics in post-New Order regime and the localized of the global football culture. The socio-politic circumstance is myriad term and its work in various ways. Even more, the Indonesia politic situation influences the pattern of organization of supporters and then the violence that they dispose. Two examples in the New Order regime and Reform Era (Era Reformasi) will help us to explain the influence of political condition for the behaviour and pattern of football fighting and violence.

First, the New Order regime deployed the floating mass concept to create an anti-politic mass that suitable for idea of development (Schwartz 1994). People expressed their voice through the quasi-democracy party once in five year but they were not allowed to express their identity and political question. The state announced that people should avoid discussing politics through warn of the matter of ‘SARA’ (ethnicity, religion, races). Local expression and political un-rest will be blamed as anti-nationalism by Jakarta-based central government. However, football fills the niche of socio-political expression and local identity through a local football association (Perserikatan or Persatuan Sepakbola). The football association generally has a long history in the provincial level, even since the colonial periods (Palupi 2004, PSSI 2000, 1980).

The association teams, which were not dependent on the whims of sponsor, attracted larger supporters who identifying football team as a part of their identity. The Stadium is the space that people can express their local identity, mainly base on provincial or city such as Surabaya (Persebaya), Jakarta (Persija), Bandung (Persib) and others. The local association-base competition continued a long standing city matches at the national level with qualifying round as it was in pre-independence. It is not surprise when the local association-base competition was popular than professionals league (GALATAMA) (Colombijn: 287).

The supporters linked with their team through locality and the association teams attracted larger fans and built a loyal follower. Each association have loyal supporters and they create rivalry with other association fans from different provinces. The violence had occurred when the local association playing final or semi-final match in Jakarta. A sizeable group of supporters from Surabaya or Semarang followed their team when their team won and played until final. The dividing line in these fights and violence patterns is not based ethnicity but the original’s place. Although the violence caused fatal damaged for infrastructure and transportation, there was no massive victims. The supporters use violence and football as expressing their local identity that was pressed by state authority.

Second, the violence in the latest periods of the New Order regime was associated with the loosing of state authority and control. It obviously worked for the football riots during the upheaval periods in Indonesia history during the years of the reformasi (1997-2001). The declining state authority made supporters lose their respect for state apparatus, both of the military and the police. The Bonek, special name for Surabaya-based supporters, is the excellent example to explain how the state loses their control over the society. The Bonek became a national issue when they caused serious damaged and intimidated their rivals in Jakarta. In 1997, the military could handle the Bonek in Jakarta and they shipped the Bonek to Surabaya with military boat. However, during 1998-1999, the military and the police could not manage the Bonek. The department of transportation could not provide sufficient transportation when the Bonek visited Jakarta to support their team in the final match.

However, the Bonek was not the only case in that period, while the violence also happened in Outer Island such as Makasar, Bali, and Medan as well as in Papua. In 1998-1999, the league cancelled because the military authority could not guarantee for security issue for all match across Indonesia stadium. For fourth years (1997-2001), 17 supporters were killed in the stadium, but this numbers probably more than officially reported. More than 50 matches were played without visitors to avoid the violence. The significant numbers of violence across Indonesia during the reformation era reveals that there is no reason to treat the Bonek or other group of supporters as special category such as hooligans in Europe (Amstrong 1996). The rise of violence and appearing of the Bonek were influenced by the generally declining respect for state authority which mark in the turbulence time in Indonesia history. The Bonek case reveals that football riots in Indonesia during the reformasi era was interwoven with the socio-political situation.

The continuity and change of Indonesia politics play important role in football games and contribute to pattern of the supporter’s behaviour and violence. For example, the decentralization process gives the district and provincial level a greater political authority. The head of district position is the important jobs that invite the competition and battle of local power. The term the ‘son of native’ (putra daerah) became popular as the tools to assert political gain. At the same time, the relation of patron-client politics with Jakarta-based oligarch is also important for the sources of politics (Nordholt 2002, Aragon 2007). With the direct election system, the mass that was forgotten in the new Order Regime becomes an important source of power. Obviously, football that is the most popular sport in this country attracts political actors across the region to grab it. Football supporters provide a political mobilization in the election for the head of district of province.

It is not surprise when there is a common phenomenon of mushrooming district-base club football. A lot of political actors exert a football club to give a new identity for their region and benefit for their political attempt. For instance, Kediri became important district when the Persik won Indonesian league twice in early 2000s. Before Persik lifted the trophy, Kediri is unfamiliar district in the map of Indonesian’s life. Several distric such as Lamongan in East Java, Wamena in Papua, Sigli in Aceh and many others that are not recognised by Indonesian public following Kediri’s strategy. Suddenly, those district are discussed in the headline of the national newspaper when their team buy an expensive player or play a fine style of football.

The emerging of district-base club has increased because the district parliament and the executive spend a lot of money for their club. A significant of public expenditure is allocated year to year to recruit foreign players and coaches, to renovate the stadium, and to pay local players. Most of the local legislative (DPRD) agree to pouring money to the club through APBD (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah) scheme. The careers of many political actors in the districtt level depend on their ability to feed the club and make enjoy local-base supporters. Likewise, the resident of the region and supporters enjoy the new identity regarding their football team. They press the politician to spend more money to improve their club and buying a good player.

Football and politics are two pictures in the same coin. When the issue of corruption, conflict, and money politics are attached the wheel of league in Indonesia, it is revealed the practice and life of political system in the post-decentralization policy. For instance, the Indonesian Corruption Watch’s (ICW) report (2010) shows that the corruption was found in the practice of issuing public expenditure for football club in four provinces. The practice of corruption linked with the key figures of political system in those regions. Having said, football organized reflects practice of politic; conversely, politic system reflects the football.

Admittedly, the club and the football association are the important institution to gain political benefit. Different parties have contested the control of association football. Politicians have used football as a vehicle for their personal career and as instrument for their political claim. The representative teams are a matter of concern to the leader, be they of the district, province, and village as well as in national level. It is common phenomena when the head of district (Bupati) and Mayor City (Walikota) also the head of football club. In the case of Indonesia, the control over football supporters and club determines succeeded of economical benefit and political career (Colombijn 2001: 184-86).

The head of district that successfully created a promised club and made supporters enjoy the match, in almost all case, won the district general election. From 26 teams that played in the Indonesian Super League during 2004-2010, 17 of them were led by the head of district, governor, and Mayor city (or their deputy), and 15 of them won the election in that periods. The incumbent, who lead the club, used their power to build loyalty among the supporters as important of political sources. They use their ‘client’ to manage and control over group of supporters. The head of a group supporter is usually proponent of political figures who hold the top position of the club.

Without question, football association and group of supporters are the space for different parties struggled for powers. Longstanding internal conflict over Indonesia Football Association (PSSI), dualism of league and the media wars over football organization reflect the battle and claims of football authority. In the same way, almost all supporters divided along the historical and political lines. For examples, in Padang, the supporters of Semen Padang split into two groups the Spartac and the Kmers. In Lamongan, the LA Mania divided in two two major groups and several small group of supporters because disagreement of their leaders about political choise for next distric election. The similar story, at least, occurred across Indonesia, from Jakarta and Surabaya and Ujung Pandang.

At the same time, football became important sports in the daily life of Indonesian. In the last decade, global football relatively made a successs to intrusive the daily life of Indonesia people. It could not isolate from the success of a marketing strategy. World cup, European tournament, and Champion League have delivered freely to the family room of millions Indonesian. Indonesian also enjoys the match from England, Italy, and Spanish league in a weekly basis because the cigarette companies pay for advertisement.

The Indonesian football fans intensively connected with football events around the world through newspaper as well as social media such as the twitter and the facebook. Internet technology make easy for supporters to build alliance with global fans. Several European big clubs, such as Liverpool, Manchester United, Milan, Juventus for a few name, create local supporter in Indonesia. There are common picture when Indonesian fans watching their national team wearing jersey, scarf or flag of European club. It is not incidentally that the throwed-conveti from the supporter in Argentinian or Brazilian stadium is found in the small stadium in Sleman or Bantul. Moreover, a lot of Indonesia club have a more European name such as Batavia Union, Mataram City, Cikarang United, and Semarang FC and so on. In the same way, the football league in national level has increase.

In the last decade, Indonesian football association tried to manage a professional league with an international standard. Certainly, the standard of security, stadium facilities, and referee is increase. The league receives a lot of money from the sponsor, especially from the cigarettes industries and television royalty. Every week, women and children come and watch the football match, and it is the common panoramic on the TV screen. Family use the stadium as the recreation sites on the weekend. Remarkably, Indonesia was success to manage the Asian cup in 2007. The venue in Jakarta and Palembang is full of spectators, and it makes the Asian Football Association (AFC) and world football organization (the FIFA) praised Indonesian football organization (PSSI) for organizing the tournament. In addition, the Indonesian national team also success to shows excellent performance and a million of Indonesian fans proud at that moment.

As far as Indonesian football fans in general is concerned, the globalization of football culture play important role in the contemporary social life of supporters. The globalization of football is not just appearing in the English name of the club, costum and syal, but also obviously and deeply influences the behaviour of supporters. Just recently, the scenery in Indonesian stadium is full of supporters who singing a special song for their club and their favourite players. The group of youth in small stadium wear a shirt with Italian word that expressed a spirit of the ultras, a popular term for fanatic football fans. Meanwhile, the huge-blues flag in the air is impress the visitors as in European stadium.

The group of Indonesian supporters both in the rural and urban area deploy military-sounded term such as the ulras, the curva, the delije, and the brigade for their groups. The curva and the ultras refer the group of loyal supporters in Italia (Podaliri & Balestri 1998: 89), while the delije and the brigade are especially groups of supporter cum para-milita group who use violence, racist, and political alliance to intimidate their opponents in Balkan Peninsula during the post-Yugoslavian wars (Foer 2004: 18).

Certainly, there is not just the transfer of foreign name, but the Indonesia football fans also try to transfers European ‘sub-culture’. According one of the Brajamusti leaders, some of their members were sent to Argentina and Balkan Peninsula to learn about the culture of the Boca Junior and the Obilic supporters in 2009. They also develop a communication with European group of supporters through social media, facebook, twitter, and yahoo messenger.

The PSS Sleman’s supporters send an email regularly to their college in Italian and East Europe to gain detailed information about organizing supporters. These alliances remain the story of Croatian club supporters made a global friendship with English hooligan in early 1990 (Kuper 1994: 17). Surprisingly, local supporters in Indonesia use more the idioms which are linked with fanatical supporters across the world. They also learn and appreciate the methods of violence that was used by group of fanatical supporters in Serbia and other place.

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The Death of Indonesian Supporters (Part I)

Oleh Darmanto Simaepa

The series of football violence in Surabaya, Jakarta and Yogyakarta in February-May 2012, where five supporters died and several injured, once again, reveals the dark side of Indonesian football. Although that violence had occurred in a close time, there is a slight dissimilarity among them. In the Gelora Bung Karno (GBK) stadium, the assault and abterry of the Jak’s Mania to visitors who suspected as the member of rival group the Vikings have showed the classic of the Indonesian football riots. GBK’s violence could be seen as a ‘spontaneous reaction’ to what happened on the pitch when some violent supporters angry because of the presence of their rivals. However, the death of Nurul Huda and Pandu’s heavily maltreatment, both in Yogyakarta, tells a new pattern of violence among the football fans.

Although the motives of attackers have not been identified clearly yet, the violence in Yogyakarta is just not spontaneous but looks like a well-planned measure. Especially, it is clear in the case of Pandu. Local newspapers report that the oppressor took their action outside the stadium. The attackers did the violence with a particular reason and prepared their action. Surprisingly, both of the oppressor and the victim have similar identity as PSS Sleman’s club supporters and they also live in the same region. The fact that the oppressors have selected a young boy as a victim is not indicates that it is classic example of an adolescent football fighting such an in Europe (Young and Giulinotti 1996: 174). Moreover, the difference of violence in Jakarta and Yogyakarta represents both of continuity and change of violence patterns in contemporary Indonesian football life.

The massive violence in Indonesian football history reflects the mirror of Indonesian socio-politics, but also reveals the interwoven of football and politics as well as football and society (Colombijn 2001: 173). The series of violence shows the continuation of a long-standing behaviour of Indonesian supporter on the pitch, but also reveals the changing pattern of violence that they deploy and the social circumstances surround them. For instances, spontaneous fighting among the supporters such as in GBK case is not a new phenomena. This kind of violence has been connected with the development of Indonesia football almost from the beginning. Fighting among the visitors in the football match as well as players with the supporter in the pitch was reported regularly in 1920s. As Dutch scholar Freek Colombijn shown (2001:193-194), several cup-final match in Padang, Pontianak and Batavia in colonial periods ended in a massive fight. One of the characteristic of mass fighting in the past is the brawlers were not anonymous adolescents, but adult.

There is significant pattern of football riot in 1970s and before. Before regular competition so-called GALATAMA and Kompetisi Perserikatan (Association Competition) in mid-1970, there was no routinely league, so the club was not play regularly. In the colonial period, the clubs played only in special moment such the birthday of Netherland’s Queen or New Years Day (Palupi 2004: 82). During 1950s-1960s, with the political turn-moil, the competition was not implemented in regular-base. The player changed their club frequently as well as their supporters. At that time, the composition of the groups of supporters was ephemeral and there was no club loyalty of a permanent core fans. Consequently, the football riots was seen as spontaneous reaction. The lack of solid supporters organization indicated that the football violences was not structured.

Contrary with the past, the current Indonesia supporters settle down to a particular club. They organized themselves like professional fans and create a loyal and fanatic fan along the district, province or city. The group of supporter, especially in the big cities like Jakarta, Bandung and Surabaya, is predominantly, although not always, by youth. Surprisingly, the current phenomena of violence is marked by co-supporters’ fighting, and an internal conflict within the supporters the club is reported regularly.

It is believed, some of the contemporary violence have linked with the struggle to gain a greater control over supporter organization and paralleled with the conflict over football association (PSSI). Remarkably several supporters use a new method of mobilization and violence that is used to European fanatics fans. Speculatively, the changing pattern of violence is results of combination of internal dynamics within supporters, the new tensions of controlling football association, and the dynamics politics (local or national) surrounded football organization.

Cultural Explanation

Despite the violence is a part of football games in Indonesia for a long time, there is limited social explanation what exactly happen with the football culture. One of the few social explanation in this field is cultural perspective which was used by Dutch scholar Freek Colombijn in The Politics of Indonesian Football (2001). Drawing through his research in Padang, West Sumatra, he shows that the football violence in late colonial period was associated with the colonial policy concerning a plural society in the East-Indies. In the late colonial periods, there was social differentiation and segregation along the European resident, Indo (Arabic, Chinese, India) and native people. Football match was a sport that drew together different races or ethnic groups, who otherwise met only at the market (Furnivall 2010). Meanwhile, the native people also organized themselves along the ethnic group such as Java, Minangkabau, Batak, or Minahasan.

A football pitch was an opportunity to express ethnic identity in opposition to other ethnic groups. Most clubs in Padang were races or ethnically assembled and matches were a way of expressing feeling against social categories. In early history of Indonesia football, the violence of supporters had occurred among the European with Chinese team as well Chinese with native spectators both in Java and in Outer Island (Colombijn 2001: 194). Eventually, the football match was the way ethnic distinction with the concomitant social inequality was reinforced, and the mass fighting in the pitch expressed it.

Furthermore, Colombijn argued that it was possible to extend the cultural explanation to the post-war periods of Indonesian football. Drawing from Javanese culture as numerically dominant group in Indonesia, he described that the Indonesian players and visitors forced to avoid the conflict and disorder on the pitch. This idea basically comes from the Javanese culture about strict order, social harmony and behavioural controls. The idea of conformity and conflict avoidance, Colombijn said, is problematic in a football match, where football is an ‘explicit conflict’ through physically contact for players. Loosing and disappointment are the part of the game. Certainly, this is impossible for Javanese players or supporters to avoid conflict and to hide their disappointment in a crowded stadium. When the tension quickly increases, the reaction for the players and supporters under such strain is the breaking up of self control, and the fight on the pitch is explodes.

The cultural explanation is helpful to explain the violence in the context of colonial periods and the early football history in Indonesia, but as Colombijn also said (p. 294), it is full of hypothesis and partial. There is the cultural essentialism aspect in Colombijn’s perspective. As a critical anthropologist mentioned (Marcus and Clifford 1985, Otner 1999), there is no cultural relation between the ethnicity and the practice of culture or action such as in the case of football violence. His explanation could not use to explaining contemporary behaviour of supporters and players. Especially in the last decade, the violence was not done by Javanese exclusively, but also occurred in Outer Island. For example, the massive fighting in Mattoangin Stadium, Makassar caused four supporter died in 2002 as well as in remote area such as in Wamena Papua or Deli Serdang in West Sumatra.

As an illustration, the Jakmania and the Vikings, two of supporter group who have reputation as master of fighting and have regularly punished by association, just possess a small number of Javanese members. The Jakmania comprises an ethnic mixture across Indonesia and the Viking is dominated by the Sundanese. In addition, the players that were punished by association due to their violence action on the pitch are mostly the foreign players such as the famous Uruguayan-born player Christiano Gonzales and Brazilian Marcio Souza.

BERSAMBUNG

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